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ABSTRACT Healthcare supply chains are complex structures spanning across multiple organizational
and geographical boundaries, providing critical backbone to services vital for everyday life. The inherent
complexity of such systems can introduce impurities including inaccurate information, lack of transparency
and limited data provenance. Counterfeit drugs is one consequence of such limitations within existing supply
chains which not only has serious adverse impact on human health but also causes severe economic loss to the
healthcare industry. Consequently, existing studies have emphasized the need for a robust, end-to-end track
and trace system for pharmaceutical supply chains. Therein, an end-to-end product tracking system across
the pharmaceutical supply chain is paramount to ensuring product safety and eliminating counterfeits. Most
existing track and trace systems are centralized leading to data privacy, transparency and authenticity issues
in healthcare supply chains. In this article, we present an Ethereum blockchain-based approach leveraging
smart contracts and decentralized off-chain storage for efficient product traceability in the healthcare supply
chain. The smart contract guarantees data provenance, eliminates the need for intermediaries and provides a
secure, immutable history of transactions to all stakeholders. We present the system architecture and detailed
algorithms that govern the working principles of our proposed solution. We perform testing and validation,
and present cost and security analysis of the system to evaluate its effectiveness to enhance traceability within
pharmaceutical supply chains.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, drug counterfeiting, traceability, healthcare, supply chain, trust, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare supply chain is a complex network of several
independent entities that include raw material suppliers,
manufacturer, distributor, pharmacies, hospitals and patients.
Tracking supplies through this network is non-trivial due
to several factors including lack of information, central-
ized control and competing behaviour among stakeholders.
Such complexity not only results in in-efficiencies such as
those highlighted through COVID-19 pandemic [1] but can
also aggravate the challenge of mitigating against coun-
terfeit drugs as these can easily permeate the healthcare
supply chain. Counterfeit drugs are products deliberately
and fraudulently produced and/or mislabeled with respect
to identity and/or source to make it appear to be a genuine
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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product [2], [3]. Such drugs can include medications that
contain no active pharmaceutical ingredient (API), an incor-
rect amount of API, an inferior-quality API, a wrong API,
contaminants, or repackaged expired products. Some coun-
terfeit medications may even be incorrectly formulated and
produced in substandard conditions [4].
According to the Health Research Funding Organization,
up to 30% of the drugs sold in developing countries are
counterfeit. Further, a recent study by World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) indicated counterfeit drugs as one of the major
causes of deaths in developing countries, and in most cases
the victims are children [7], [8]. In addition to the adverse
impact on human lives, counterfeit drugs also cause signif-
icant economic loss to the pharmaceutical industry. In this
respect, the annual economic loss to the US pharmaceutical
industry due to counterfeit medicine is estimated around
$200 billion [9], [10].
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FIGURE 1. Drug supply chain stakeholders and their relationships.
A typical drug supply chain distribution process is illus-
trated in Figure 1. An API supplier is responsible for deliv-
ering the raw materials to manufacture drugs approved by a
regulatory agency such as the US Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (US FDA). The manufacturer packages the drugs into
a Lot or sends it to a re-packager. The primary distributor
receives several Lots of the product and is responsible for
transferring them to pharmacies based on product demand
or secondary distributors (in case the quantity of Lots is
very large) who can transfer these Lots to the pharmacies.
Finally, a pharmacy will dispense the drug to patients [11]
typically based on a doctor’s prescription. Throughout the
supply chain, the transfer of drugs is usually facilitated by
third party logistic service providers such as UPS or FedEx
and in some cases the distributors operate their own fleet of
vehicles to transport the products.
The primary reason for counterfeit drugs to reach end-user
marketplace is due to the complex structure of a healthcare
supply chain. Leveraging the complexity of this distribution
process, medications can easily pass through with little or
no trail of information and verifiable documentation [12].
Consequently, monitoring, effective control and tracking of
products in healthcare supply chain is fundamental to com-
bating counterfeits.
The importance of drug traceability (track and trace) is
increasingly emphasized and mandated by several countries
across the world. For example, the U.S. Drug Supply Chain
Security Act (DSCSA) has made it mandatory for the phar-
maceutical industry to develop an electronic and interopera-
ble system that identifies and tracks prescription drugs as they
are distributed across the United States [13]. Similarly, over
the last 8 years, China required all the stakeholders involved
in the drugs supply chain to record information of individual
pharmaceutical products in a specialized IT system whenever
drugs are sent to/from their warehouses [14]. Therefore, drug
traceability has become an integral part of the pharmaceutical
supply chain as it establishes authenticity, and aims to track
and trace chain of custody of the product across drug supply
chain.
Blockchain technology has introduced a new model of
application development primarily based on the successful
implementation of the data structure within the Bitcoin appli-
cation. The fundamental concept of the blockchain data struc-
ture is similar to a linked list i.e. it is shared among all the
nodes of the network where each node keeps its local copy of
all the blocks (associated with the longest chain) starting from
its genesis block [15]. Recently, many real-world applications
have been developed in diverse domains, such as the Internet
of Things [16], e-Government [17] and e-document manage-
ment [18]. These applications leverage benefits of blockchain
technology due to its self-cryptographic validation structure
among transactions (through hashes), and public availability
of distributed ledger of transaction-records in a peer-to-peer
network. Creating a chain of blocks connected by crypto-
graphic constructs (hashes) makes it very difficult to tamper
the records, as it would cost the rework from the genesis to
the latest transaction in blocks as illustrated by [19].
Within the context of blockchain-based traceability for
pharmaceutical supply chain, [20] presents one of the ini-
tial efforts. Although our solution has similarities with this
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effort due to the focus on pharmaceutical supply chain as
well as the use of blockchains, we take a holistic view of
the pharmaceutical supply chain, presenting an end-to-end
solution for drug traceability whereas [20] only focused on
a subset of these challenges. Firstly, our approach iden-
tifies and engages major stakeholders in the drug supply
chain i.e. the FDA, supplier, manufacturer, distributor, phar-
macy, and patient, whereas [20] is limited to the supplier,
manufacturer, and wholesaler as the stakeholders. Conse-
quently, the pharmacists are represented as an external entity
which is not the case in a real drug supply chain. Secondly,
we make explicit efforts to identify and define relationships
among stakeholders, on-chain resources, smart contracts,
and decentralized storage systems which is lacking in [20].
Furthermore, in view of the significance of interactions
among stakeholders, we have included precise definitions to
remove any ambiguity, whereas such interactions have not
been defined as part of [20]. Thirdly, we use the smart con-
tracts technology to achieve real-time, seamless traceability
with push notifications so as to minimize human intervention
and therefore undesired delays. Specifically, each drug Lot
is assigned a unique smart contract that generates an event
whenever a change in ownership occurs and a list of events
is delivered to the DApp user. However, the smart contracts
in [20] are programmed for specific roles such as supplier,
manufacturer, and wholesaler which requires each participant
tomanually confirmwhich drugs are received. Such approach
can introduce delays and inaccuracies in the immutable data
stored on the ledger. Finally, we have conducted a cost and
security analysis to evaluate the performance of the proposed
solution including discussion on how the proposed solution
can be generalized to other supply chains.
The challenge of achieving traceability to mitigate against
counterfeit drugs is well-established and several efforts have
been made to address this within pharmaceutical indus-
try. However, a careful review of literature presents several
gaps and opportunities for a comprehensive application of
blockchain technology for drug traceability. In this context,
the primary contributions of this article can be summarized
as follows:
• We propose a blockchain-based solution for the pharma-
ceutical supply chain that provides security, traceability,
immutability, and accessibility of data provenance for
pharmaceutical drugs.
• We design a smart contract capable of handling various
transactions among pharmaceutical supply chain stake-
holders.
• We present, implement and test the smart contract that
defines the working principles of our proposed solution.
• We conduct security and cost analysis to evaluate the
performance of the proposed blockchain-based solution.
The reminder of this article is organized as follows.
Section II presents a critical review of existing efforts with
respect to traceability in the healthcare supply chain. This is
followed by a description of the proposed blockchain-based
track & trace system for phamaceutical products in
section III. Section IV presents the implementation of the pro-
posed system along with details of the testing and evaluation
in section V. Section VI describes the efforts to evaluate the
proposed system and analyzes the outcomes of evaluation.
Section VII concludes this article summarizing contributions
and highlighting avenues for further work.
II. RELATED WORK
We present a critical overview of existing efforts focused
at addressing the issue of product traceability in the
healthcare supply chain emphasizing solutions proposed
for anti-counterfeiting. We have included both blockchain
and non-blockchain-based approaches and categorized them
accordingly.
A. TRADITIONAL EFFORTS FOR DRUG TRACEABILITY
Traceability is defined as the ability to access any or all infor-
mation relating to the object under consideration, throughout
its life cycle, by means of recorded identifications. The object
under consideration is referred to as Traceable Resource
Unit (TRU) which is any traceable object within the supply
chain. Traceability objectives are twofold; to track the history
of transactions, and to track the real-time position of the
TRU. In this context, a traceability system requires access to
information related to the drug which is the TRU in the supply
chain by using different identification techniques to record its
identity and distinguish it from other TRUs. The components
of a traceability system can be broadly identified by a mecha-
nism for identifying TRUs, a mechanism for documenting the
connections between TRUs, and a mechanism for recording
the attributes of the TRUs [21].
Existing solutions within supply chain management have
traditionally used barcodes and RFID tags as identifica-
tion techniques, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) to cap-
ture data, and Electronic Product Code (EPC) to identify,
capture, and share product information to facilitate track-
ing of goods through different stages [22]. In this context,
Smart-Track [23] utilizes GS1 standards barcodes containing
unique serialized product identifier, Lot production and expi-
ration dates. The information contained in the GS1 barcode
is captured across various supply chain processes and used to
maintain a continuous log of ownership transfers. As each
stakeholder records the possession of the product, an end
user (patient) can verify authenticity through central data
repository maintained as Global Data Synchronization Net-
work (GDSN) by using a smartphone app. In the downstream
supply chain at the warehouse, pharmacy and hospital units
can scan the barcode to verify the product and its character-
istics. Similarly, Data-Matrix tracking system [24] creates a
Data-Matrix for each drug which includes the manufacturer
ID, Product ID, Unique ID of the package, the authentication
code, and an optional meta-data. This allows the patient to
verify the origin of the drug by using the attached Data-
Matrix.
More recently Near Field Communication (NFC) tags have
been proposed to be used to achieve visibility and authenticity
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across pharmaceutical supply chain. In this respect, [25]
presents an effort to develop a NFC-based system which
affords visibility throughout different stages of pharmaceu-
tical supply chain. Each drug is registered and authenticated
by using a key value and an NFC tag is attached to it. Similar
to the previous two solutions, the user or the patient can verify
the authenticity or the origin of the drug by scanning the
attached NFC tag using a mobile application.
Corrado et al. [26], Supriya and Djearamane [27], and
Jamal et al. [28] have proposed solutions for traceability but
they use a centralized database whichmakes tampering goods
information relatively easy and difficult to detect. In addition
to that, the use of different types of centralized databases can
result in the proposed solutions to have lack of interoperabil-
ity and scalability.
B. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR DRUG
TRACEABILITY
Traditional solutions to achieve traceability within phar-
maceutical supply chain are typically centralized and
lack transparency across participants of the supply chain,
which allows the central authority to modify information
without notifying other stakeholders. On the other hand,
a blockchain based solution offers data security, trans-
parency, immutability, provenance and authenticated transac-
tion records. Blockchain is a decentralized, immutable shared
ledger that can be applied to a variety of business settings
involving transaction processes.
Transparency and traceability are used interchangeably
however, they represent very different concepts. Trans-
parency is usually used when referring to high-level informa-
tion of a supply chain. For example, product’s components,
facilities locations, names of suppliers, etc. with the objec-
tive to map the whole supply chain. However, traceability is
related to granular information where it envisages choosing a
specific component to trace, determines common standards to
communicate with partners, implements methods to produce
and gather accurate data, selects a platform to store traceabil-
ity data, and determines how to share data on the platform.
Although both terms represent different concepts, they rely on
each other because accessing granular information requires
full understanding of the supply chain.
In this respect, a number of existing approaches leverage
cryptographic properties of blockchain to achieve a decen-
tralized, verifiable track and trace system for pharmaceutical
drugs. Mettler [32] have discussed the use of blockchain
based approach for various issues in healthcare sector with no
technical details or specific application. Kurki [33], presented
the advantages of blockchain technology in pharmaceuti-
cal supply chain. However, similar to [32] only conceptual
discussion was provided. Muniandy and Ong Tze Ern [20]
proposed a traceability system using Ethereum for anti-
counterfeiting. The proposed solution employs smart contract
however it lacks implementation or evaluation which limits
understanding the contribution.
Huang et al. [34] proposed a drug traceability system,
Drugledger, which reflects the practical drug transaction
logic in the supply chain, and generates both authenticity
and privacy of stakeholders’ traceability information without
losing the resilience of the system. Drugledger completes its
workflow based on the expanded UTXO data structure, espe-
cially that of package, repackage, and unpackage. However,
recent studies such as [35] have highlighted concerns with
the use of UTXO data structure with respect to its weakness
in programmability, high storage cost, and low state space
utilization.
Faisal et al. [36], proposed a Hyperledger-based solution
for drug traceability in the pharmaceutical supply chain.
Authors report increase in the performance in terms of
throughput and minimizes latency of the proposed system
with less utilization of resources, however their solution was
not rigorously tested and was implemented in a small-sized
network. This effort also highlighted the challenge of achiev-
ing scalable solutions with blockchain which has received
significant attention in recent literature such as [22]. Similar
concerns are valid for the approach adopted by Hulseap-
ple [38] who developed a private blockchain concurrently
with the Bitcoin, which is used as a ledger to hash certain data
to secure the transactions in chain. Every product has its own
permanent record on their blockchain, making it impossible
to manipulate with the private keys. The system was designed
to protect every stage of product transfer in the supply chain,
creating a trustless system of transparency.
In addition to the above, a number of active projects exist
which are focused at exploring use of distributed ledger tech-
nologies to achieve traceability within pharmaceutical supply
chain. For instance, Arsene [39] involves leading compa-
nies including IBM, Cisco, Accenture, Intel, Bloomberg, and
Block stream where every drug is issued with a timestamp,
making it traceable with its origin and manufacturer details.
Similarly, MediLedger [40] investigates use of blockchain
to provide a solution compliant with the DSCSA regula-
tion to increase interoperability in the industry. Farmatrust
project [41] aims to improve traceability in pharmaceutical
industry based on Quorum blockchain with future plans to
accommodate other platforms such as Ethereum and Hyper-
ledger. The use of Quorum blockchain presents challenges
such as lack of transaction ordering of transactions and policy
enforcement which limits it widespread use.
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DRUG TRACEABILITY SYSTEM
FOR PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAINS
Figure 2 presents a high-level architecture for the proposed
drug traceability system together with the stakeholder and
their interactions with the smart contract. The stakehold-
ers are envisioned to access the smart contract, decentral-
ized storage system and on-chain resources through software
devices that have front-end layer denoted by a DApp (Decen-
tralized Application) which is connected to the smart con-
tract, on-chain resources, and decentralized storage system
by an application program interface (API) such as Infura,
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FIGURE 2. A high-level architecture for the proposed blockchain-based system for pharmaceutical supply chain.
Web3, and JSON RPC. The stakeholders will interact with
the smart contract to initiate pre-authorized function calls
and with the decentralized storage systems to access data
files. Finally, their interaction with the on-chain resources
will be for obtaining information such as logs, IPFS hashes,
and transactions. More details on the system components are
presented below.
• Stakeholders include regulatory agencies such as FDA,
manufacturers, distributors, pharmacies, and patients.
These stakeholders act as participants in the smart con-
tract and are assigned specific functions based on their
role in the supply chain. They are also given access to
the on-chain resources such as history and log infor-
mation to track transactions in supply chain. Further,
they are authorized to access information stored on the
IPFS such as the drug Lot images, and information
leaflets.
• Decentralized Storage System (IPFS [42] )provides a
low-cost off-chain storage to store supply chain transac-
tions data to ensure reliability, accessibility, and integrity
of the stored data. The integrity of data is maintained by
generating a unique hash for every uploaded file on its
server, and the different hashes for the different uploaded
files are then stored on the blockchain and accessed
through the smart contract, and any change that occurs
to any of the uploaded file is reflected in the associated
hash.
• Ethereum Smart Contract is used to handle the
deployment of the supply chain. The smart contract is
central and essential for tracking the history of trans-
actions and manages the hashes from the decentralized
storage server which allows the participants to access
the supply chain information. Moreover, the functions
of the different stakeholders in the supply chain are
defined within the smart contract and access to these
functions is given to the authorized participants by using
modifiers. A modifier is basically a way to decorate a
function by adding additional features to it or to apply
some restrictions. The smart contract also handles the
transactions, such as selling drug Lots or boxes.
• On-chain Resources are used to store the logs and
events that are created by the smart contract allowing
track and trace. Moreover, a registration and identity
system is used as an on-chain resource to associate
the Ethereum address of the different participants to a
human readable text which is stored in a decentralized
way.
The system components are envisaged to function in an
integrated manner to track the history of the drug under
consideration to verify its authenticity, and no real-time track-
ing will be required because the DApp user will only need
to use the proposed solution to verify that the drug under
consideration is not counterfeit and it came from a trusted
manufacturer. If real-time location of a drug Lot is to be
tracked, a number of technologies can be implemented to
accomplish this task. For example, IoT-enabled smart con-
tainers is equipped with sensors that continuously monitor
and track the TRU from its starting point to its destination.
The IoT sensor includes Global Positioning System (GPS)
receiver to locate where the TRU is at, temperature sensor to
keep track of the temperature, and pressure sensor to measure
the pressure differences that detect any opening or closing of
the container [43]
Figure 3 illustrates interaction among different participants
of the supply chain within proposed system and can be
loosely divided into three phases explained below.
Manufacturing: Typically, a manufacturer will send a
request for approval from the FDA to initiate the manufactur-
ing process of a drug Lot. Once the FDA approves the request,
the manufacturer initiates the manufacturing process and an
event is declared to all participants. The manufacturer will
upload images of the drug Lot to the IPFS, and the IPFS will
send a hash to the smart contract so that the images can be
accessed later by authorized participants. The drug Lot will
be delivered to the distributor for packaging concluding the
manufacturing process.
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FIGURE 3. Sequence Diagram showing interactions among the participating entities of the smart contract.
Distribution: The next step is the initiation of the distri-
bution process, the distributor will pack the drug Lot, and an
image of the package will be uploaded to the IPFS which will
send a hash to the smart contract. Once this step is completed,
the drug Lot packages will be delivered to pharmacies, and
this ends the distribution phase.
Sale/ConsumptionThe last step in the sequence diagram
is related to the interaction between the pharmacy and the
patients. Here, the pharmacy will initiate the sale of drug
Lot box and it will be declared to the participants of the
supply chain. Then, an image of the sold drug package will
be uploaded to the IPFS, and a hash will be sent by the IPFS
to the smart contract. The drug Lot box will be sold to the
patient, and this concludes the drug Lot selling phase. This
process will ensure that all the transactions are stored and can
be accessed later by all the supply chain participants to check
the authenticity and validity of the products in the supply
chain in the form of a sequence of events.
A. COMPARISON OF PROPOSED SOLUTION WITH
EXISTING SOLUTIONS
In this section, we present a comparative analysis of the pro-
posed solution for traceable supply chain for pharmaceutical
drugs with relevant existing solutions. A summary of this
analysis is presented in Table 1.
The proposed solution is decentralized which is an impor-
tant feature as it prevents any single entity from manipu-
lating or modifying the data. Another important feature of
TABLE 1. Comparison between our proposed solution and the
non-blockchain solutions.
our solution is resilience, since the solution is decentralized,
it eliminates single point of failure. Blockchain offers excel-
lent solution for data integrity and security due to its features
such as data immutability, therefore once the information
is added to the ledger it cannot be removed or modified.
The security of data is maintained because it’s stored in a
decentralized way which makes no single entity capable of
simultaneous manipulation of data. Transparency of trans-
actions is an important aspect for any supply chain. In our
proposed solution, all participants can access and view the
verified all transactions in a trusted environment. Finally, all
the solutions in Table 1 share one common feature which is
the track and trace feature, however other features such as
decentralized storage, integrity and transparency are funda-
mental to achieving a trustworthy track and trace system.
Table 2 compares our proposed solution with other
blockchain-based solutions. Our solution uses Ethereum
blockchain where as the solution in [34] uses Bitcoin
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FIGURE 4. Entity Relationship Diagram.
TABLE 2. Comparison between our proposed solution and other
blockchain-based solutions.
blockchain and the solution in [32] uses Hyperledger-Fabric.
Moreover, both our solution and [34] operate in pub-
lic permissioned mode whereas [32] operates in private
permissioned mode which is an inherent feature in
Hyperledger-fabric. The payment method in our solution
is Ether which is the currency of Ethereum. The solution
in [34] uses BTC currency and [32] does not have a currency.
Furthermore, in all solutions data is stored on-chain but our
solution has an additional feature which allows storing data
off-chain as well. Finally, Both our solution and [32] have
programmable modules which are the smart contract and
docker container respectively. However, the solution in [34]
does not provide a programmable module.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED
TRACEABILITY SYSTEM
The proposed solution is developed using the Ethereum
blockchain platform. Ethereum is a permissionless public
blockchain which means it can be accessed by anyone. The
smart contract is written in Solidity language, and compiled
and tested using Remix IDE. Remix is an online web-based
development environment for writing and executing codes for
smart contracts, and it also allows the user to debug and test




The manufacturer will first deploy the smart contract in
which details of the manufactured drug Lot will be defined,
declared and an event will be triggered and announced to
all participants in the supply chain. In case new participants
are added to the network, they will have access to the events
since they are permanently stored on the ledger and therefore
they can track and trace the history of any manufactured drug
Lot. The manufacturer also has the option of uploading an
image of the Lot to the IPFS so that it can be accessed by
participating entities to visually inspect the drug Lot. Prior to
the sale of the newly manufactured Lot, it has to be packaged,
the manufacturer will announce to other participants that the
newly manufactured Lot is available for sale by sending an
event. Participating entities interested in buying the newly
manufactured Lot will have to access a function that is spe-
cialized in selling Lots, and once the transaction is finalized,
an event will notify the participants declaring the new owner
of the Lot. The manufacturer will not be eligible to deploy
the smart contract for the drug Lot unless it is approved by
the FDA but for the sake of simplicity, this approval is not
implemented in the smart contract.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship among the different
entities with the smart contract. First, the smart contract will
be deployed using the attributes shown in Figure 4 such as
the ownerID, which has the Ethereum address of the current
smart contract owner. One important thing to note here is that
the owner ID is an address and not mapping because drug
Lot smart contract can only have one owner ID and once
the ownership changes an event will be emitted and stored
on the blockchain, and these events will be used to trace the
origin of the drug Lot. Because the smart contract represents
a particular drug Lot, it has other attributes such as the lot-
Name, lotPrice, numBoxes,boxPrice, and Image. Moreover,
there are three mappings for the authorized entities that are
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FIGURE 5. Function calls and events for two different scenarios for Lot
sale.
allowed to access certain functions within the smart con-
tract, namely, manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies.
The smart contract also has several functions needed to carry
out the manufacturing process and sale process of the Lots.
Adding the details of the manufactured Lot is accomplished
by using function calls lotDetails that includes lotName,
lotPrice, numBoxes, and boxPrice as an inputs. In addition,
the manufacturer has the option of uploading images to the
IPFS where the IPFS hash of the image is saved and accessed
by other entities. The relationship between the smart contract
and the IPFS is a 1:1 relationship because every Lot will have
one image uploaded to the IPFS.
Figure 5 shows an illustrative scenario of a buyer attempt-
ing to buy the Lot from a seller. In a real-life supply chain,
such a scenario will occur between the manufacturer and
the distributor, or between the distributor and the pharmacy.
The sequence diagram in Figure 5 can be generalized for
both scenarios. Firstly, the Lot seller adds the Lot details by
using the lotDetails function optionally uploading an image
of that Lot to the IPFS as well as storing the hash along
with other details of the Lot on chain. After that, the seller
announces to all participants that the Lot is currently for sale
via the grantSale function. An entity interested in buying the
Lot executes the buyLot function which has two important
requirements. Firstly, the executor of the function shouldn’t
have the same Ethereum address as the owner of the Lot, and
secondly, the buyer should have sufficient funds to buy the
Lot, thereby leading to two possible alternatives. Specifically,
if the specified funds by the buyer do not match the price
of the Lot, the transaction will fail. However, if the funds
are equal to the price of the Lot then the transaction will be
considered successful, and the funds will be transferred to the
buyer.
Figure 6 shows a similar scenario to the one depicted
in Figure 5 with subtle variations. In this case, the buyer
will be specify a certain number of boxes from the Lot to be
purchased. This scenario usually happens in a real pharma-
ceutical supply chain between the pharmacy and the patient.
The buyer initiates the process by executing the buyBox
function with the number of boxes needed and can result in
FIGURE 6. Function calls and events for two different scenarios for lot
boxes sale.
two outcomes. If the transferred amount does not match the
price of the boxes it will result in failure of the transaction.
However, if the transferred amount is exactly equal to the
price of the requested boxes, the price of the boxes will
be transferred to the seller. Moreover, the number of boxes
owned by the two entities will be updated according to the
quantity purchased. Finally, the transaction will be finalized
and declared successful to all participants.
To further clarify the various functions of the smart con-
tract, we present various algorithms used in our proposed
solution. It should be noted that when referring to a buyer or
a seller it only includes the authorized entities who are given
the permission to execute the functions The following are the
main functions with their corresponding algorithms.
• Creating a Lot: Algorithm 1 explains the steps in cre-
ating a Lot. The inputs to the smart contract needed
by the functions are shown with their descriptions. The
function executes only if the address of the caller is
the same as the address of the ownerID. If the caller is
granted access, he/she will have the authority to update
the fields in Algorithm 1. Once all fields have been
updated the two events will update the status as shown
in Algorithm 1.
• Grant Lot Sale: The algorithm 2 describes Granting
Lot Sale of the drug. This algorithm is responsible for
sending an event alerting all participants that the Lot is
currently available for sale, and can only be triggered if
the caller is the ownerID holder.
• Buying Lot: Algorithm 3 describes the transactions
between the buyer and the seller of the drug Lot.
It requires the caller of the function (buyer) to not have
the same address as seller (to ensures Lot owner doesn’t
buy his own Lot) and requires the transferred amount to
be exactly equal to the Lot price. Once both requirements
are fulfilled, the sale amount will be transferred to the
seller. Moreover, the ownerID will be updated. Finally,
an event will be triggered to announce the sale of the Lot
and update the new owner details. An important thing to
note here is that only trusted entities are allowed to use
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Algorithm 1 Creating a Lot in Smart Contract
Input: lotName, lotPrice, numBoxes, boxPrice, IPFShash,
Caller, OwnerID
Output: An event declaring that the Lot has been manufac-
tured
An event declaring that the image of the Lot has been
uploaded
Data:
lotName: is the name of the Lot
lotPrice: is the specified price of the Lot
numBoxes: is the total number of boxes within a Lot
boxPrice: is the price of each box within a Lot
IPFShash: is the IPFS hash of the Lot image
ownerID: is the Ethereum address of the owner of the Lot
initialization;






Emit an event declaring that the Lot has been manufac-
tured
Emit an event declaring that the Lot image has been
uploaded to the IPFS server
else
Revert contract state and show an error.
Algorithm 2 Granting Lot Sale
Output: An event declaring that the Lot is for sale
initialization;
if Caller == ownerID then
Emit an event stating that the Lot is up for sale
else
Revert contract state and show an error.
the smart contract. Therefore, when a Lot is announced
sold, the buyer can rest assure that the seller is trusted
and the Lot will be delivered.
• Buying Lot Boxes: Algorithm 4 is similar to Algo-
rithm 3, with subtle difference. The initiation of this
algorithm is similar to Algorithm 3 but the buyer is
required to specify the exact number of boxes within
the Lot. The amount transferred by the buyer has to be
exactly equal to the number of boxes the buyer wants
to buy multiplied with the price of each box. The main
difference here is that there is mapping for the addresses
of the buyers with the number of boxes purchased, and
the mapping gets updated every time this function gets
executed successfully.
B. TRACEABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE
PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this subsection, the different steps adopted to verify the
authenticity of the drug Lot are illustrated. Every drug Lot
Algorithm 3 Buying Lot
Input: ownerID, Buyer, Seller, Transferred Amount, lotPrice
Output: An event declaring that the Lot has been sold
Data: ownerID: The Ethereum address of the current Lot
owner
Buyer : The Ethereum Address of the buyer
Seller : The Ethereum Address of the Seller
Transferred Amount: The amount transferred to the function
lotPrice: The price of the Lot
initialization;
if Buyer 6= Seller ∧ TransferredAmount = lotPrice then
Transfer the price of the Lot to the seller
Update ownerID by replacing the seller Ethereum address
to the buyer Ethereum Address
Emit an event declaring that the Lot has been sold
else
Revert contract state and show an error.
is manufactured with a smart contract that is specifically
designed for it and is responsible for triggering events and
logging them on the ledger. A unique Ethereum address is
generated for every drug Lot. However, copying Ethereum
address of each drug is cumbersome, time consuming, and
error prone process. Therefore, a QR code is used which
can be easily scanned using smartphones. A QR code is a
two-dimensional barcode that is readable by smartphones,
and it can allow encoding over 4000 characters in a two
dimensional barcode. Mapping an Ethereum address to a QR
code can be done by using an Ethereum QR code generator in
which the Ethereum address is passed and a unique QR code
is generated which will exclusively map to that Ethereum
address every time it gets scanned. Once the QR code gets
attached to the drug Lot, it can be dispensed to patients.
Figure 7 illustrates the steps to verify the authenticity of a
drug. The first step is scanning the QR code that is attached to
the drug by using a DApp which interacts with the Ethereum
node (local or remote node) through web3j. To map the QR
code to its corresponding Ethereum address, the DApp has to
interact with the Ethereum node (Infura for example) through
JSON-RPC. The Ethereum node has a replica of the ledger,
and it is extremely important for the users because it makes
the process smooth and easy by saving them the effort of
having to set up their own Ethereum node which takes a lot of
time. The gateway (Ethereum node) will map the Ethereum
address of the drug Lot to the smart contract which will point
to the events of the different functions of the smart contract
that are stored in the ledger [45].
The service user will be able to verify the origin of the
drug Lot by utilizing the event filtering feature which is based
on the smart contract Ethereum address and the event name.
Event filtering allows the service user to access the various
events which are already stored on the immutable ledger of
the Ethereum blockchain from which the service user can
confirm if the drug is authentic or not. First, the service user
can use the lotSold event to enter the pharmacy Ethereum
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FIGURE 7. Application use case of the proposed blockchain-based solution.
Algorithm 4 Buying Lot Boxes
Input: ownerID, Buyer, Seller, Transferred Amount,
boxPrice, numBoxes, numBoxesToBuy, Transferred
Amount, boxesPatient
Output: An event declaring that the Lot boxes have been sold
Data: ownerID: The Ethereum address of the current Lot
owner
Buyer : The Ethereum Address of the buyer
Seller : The Ethereum Address of the Seller
Transferred Amount: The amount transferred to the function
boxPrice: The price of the Lot box
numBoxes: The total number of boxes in the Lot
numBoxesToBuy: The number of boxes the buyer wants to
buy
boxesPatient: Maps the number of boxes bought to the buyer
address
initialization;
if Buyer 6= Seller ∧ TransferredAmount = numBoxesTo-
Buy*boxPrice then
Transfer the price of the boxes to the seller
Update ownerID by replacing the seller Ethereum address
to the buyer Ethereum address
Update numBoxes owned by the seller by decreasing the
sold amount from it
Update boxesPatient by assigning the purchased amount
to the buyer address
else
Revert contract state and show an error.
address to verify the drug Lot was sold to the pharmacy
legally. After that, the lotSale event can be used to fetch infor-
mation about the drug Lot such as its name, number of boxes,
and the price which allows the service user to verify that the
pricing of the drug Lot is correct. Next, the imageuploaded
event can be used to view the image of the manufactured Lot
and boxeswhich shows if the product the service user receives
matches the authentic one. Then, the lotManufactured event
can be used to check if the Ethereum address of the
TABLE 3. The Ethereum address of each participant in the testing
scenario.
manufacturermatches the original one. Finally, the newOwner
event is used to view the Ethereum address of the original
owner of the smart contract to confirm its authenticity.
The Ethereum network presented in Figure 7 illustrates
how the information is distributed among the participating
nodes. Each node in the network will have a replica of the
ledger that is immutable which will ensure that any informa-
tion that is fetched from the ledger is authentic and there is
no way it has been manipulated with. The requested events
and information about change of ownership will be fetched
from the Ethereum network and they will be synced with the
Ethereum gateway (Infura), and once the syncing is done they
will be transferred to the DApp and displayed to the user [46].
This application use case demonstrates the effectiveness of
our proposed solution with respect to effective track and trace
of drugs within a pharmaceutical supply chain. It achieves
this by automating processes without requiring manual input
from the user and utilizing different features of the Ethereum
blockchain such as web3j, JSON-RPC, and Infura.
V. TESTING AND VALIDATION
In order to asses the smart contracts developed via Ethereum,
Remix IDE in-browser developing and testing environment
was used to test and validate different functions. The scenar-
ios involved three different participants and their correspond-
ing Ethereum Addresses as presented in Table 3.
We further present the transactions and logs of the smart
contract’s functions below.
• lotDetails: In this function, it was testedwhether the cur-
rent owner of the smart contract is able to add the details
of a newly manufactured Lot such as the Lot name, Lot
price, number of boxes within the Lot, and the price of
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FIGURE 8. Successful execution of lotDetails Function.
FIGURE 9. Successful execution of grantSale Function.
FIGURE 10. Successful execution of buyLot Function.
FIGURE 11. Successful execution of buyBox Function.
each box. A successful execution of the function and its
corresponding logs and events are displayed in Figure 8.
• grantSale: The grantSale function has a simple task yet
it’s very important, it basically notifies all the entities
that the manufactured Lot is currently for sale. A suc-
cessful execution of the function is given in Figure 9.
• buyLot: In this function, Participant2 (Table 3 shows the
corresponding Ethereum address) is used to buy the Lot
from Participant1. Participant1 has specified the correct
amount of ether (which is 1Ether as shown in Figure 8)
to transfer and the successful execution of the function
is shown in Figure 10.
• buyBox: This function deals with transactions related
to purchase of specific number of boxes from the Lot
(usually happens between a patient and the pharmacy).
Figure 11 shows a successful execution of this function
where Participant3 purchases 50 boxes from Partici-
pant2. The price of the boxes has been selected arbitrar-
ily and they may not be logical but the purpose here is
to confirm that the execution of the functions properly.
VI. DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss generalization of the pro-
posed Ethereum blockchain-based solution, present cost and
security analysis for drug traceability in supply chain, and
discuss blockchain limitations in supply chains.
A. GENERALIZATION
The proposed work in this article demonstrates how
blockchain technology can be applied for drug traceability
in a pharmaceutical supply chain. Although the functions in
the smart contract were defined in a way that fits the pharma-
ceutical supply chain specifically, it can be easily extended to
other types of supply chains [47].
The main difference between the pharmaceutical supply
chain and any other supply chain is the products/items that are
being shipped, distributed, and sold and the way they are han-
dled throughout the process. For example, some pharmaceu-
tical drugs require very specific conditions like temperature
and humidity while they are being transferred from a point to
another whereas a spare part supply chain for example would
have very different conditions. Since live tracking is out of
the scope of this article, tracing the origin of a product/item
regardless of its type will be very similar because it only
requires the scanning of a unique identification code which
is attached to the product/item and the DApp will handle
the rest. The only difference might occur in the way unique
identifications are generated for the products/items which
does not hinder the process.
Figure 2 can be used as a reference to discuss the gen-
eralized application of the proposed solution in a different
supply chain. Based on the specific supply chain application,
for example, food, spare parts or other application the stake-
holders of the supply chain and their role needs modification.
Moreover, the use of a decentralized storage systemmight not
be needed in cases where there is no necessity to store and
access large data files from off-chain. Finally, the on-chain
resources can be modified according to the needs of the pro-
posed application, for example, a reputation system, payment
and funds transfer setup might not be needed. In such cases
the on chain storage will be more than adequate to retain the
transaction logs amid stakeholders.
The entity relationship diagram can be also modified, for
example, if a supply chain has an application that requires
the use of more than one parent smart contract then it will
have to be added and define its relationship with the other
entities. Another possibility is the creation of more than one
product at a time which requires an extension to the functions
to accommodate the additional products, and this can be
achieved by modifying the existing smart contract.
Finally, the defined algorithms follow simple and easy to
grasp steps, and similar algorithms are followed in many
other supply chains [48]. This fact can be used to adjust the
customize the algorithms used in this article to fit the needs
of specific supply chain application.
B. COST ANALYSIS
This subsection presents cost analysis of the Ethereum smart
contract code and the function calls. When a transaction is
executed on the Ethereum blockchain, it costs gas to send it
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TABLE 4. Gas Costs of the Smart Contract Functions.
to the Ethereum blockchain. Remix IDE is a very useful and
easy to use tool to estimate the gas costs for the execution
and transaction which are the main types of gas costs. The
execution cost is the cost of executing different functions in
the smart contract whereas the transaction cost deals with
several factors such as the deployment of the contract, and
any data that gets sent to the blockchain network.
Table 4 shows the gas costs of the different functions used
in the smart contract, and it also shows the costs converted
into fiat currency (USD). An average gas price of 2.8 GWEI
was used according to the ETH gas station [49] pricing
accessed on Apr 10, 2020. It should be noted that gas prices
vary over time and the ones used here will most likely change.
However, they have been used in this context to show that the
cost of executing these functions is relatively low. Further-
more, a paid oracle service (Chainlink for example) can be
used to get the latest price of Ethereum which is then used to
convert the transaction and executions costs into USD.
Table 3 presents that the cost in USD is very minimal for
all four functions. The function that costs the most is the
lotDetails which is executed by the smart contract owner
(manufacturer). This relatively high cost can be explained due
to changes in five different variables in the function which
requires storage. On the other hand, grantSale function costs
the least, as this function only broadcasts an event to notify
the participants that the Lot is available for sale. From the
previous observations, it can be concluded that the gas costs
are proportional to the number of changes in the state of the
smart contract, and it also shows how storage can increase
costs dramatically, so it’s really important for the user of the
smart contract to upload the correct details of the drug Lot
because once the function is executed it cannot be reverted
and the Gas fees are gone forever.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR THE BLOCKCHAIN-BASED
HEALTHCARE SUPPLY CHAIN
In this subsection, we discuss briefly the security analysis
of the proposed blockchain-based solution for the health-
care supply chain where integrity, accountability, autho-
rization, availability, and non-repudiation are considered as
key security goals. Moreover, we discuss how our solution
is resilient against common attacks including Man-In-The-
Middle(MITM) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).
• Integrity: The primary objective of the proposed
blockchain solution is to keep track of all the transac-
tions that occur within the healthcare supply chain ensur-
ing traceability of the history of the Lots, ownership
transfers and their corresponding boxes. This is ensured
in the proposed solution because all events and logs are
stored in the immutable blockchain ledger. Moreover,
the use of IPFS to store images of the manufactured Lots
adds integrity to the proposed solution. This will ensure
that every transaction within the healthcare supply chain
can be tracked and traced.
• Accountability: As demonstrated in section V, each
execution of a function has the Ethereum address of
the caller stored on the blockchain which means trac-
ing the function caller is always possible. Therefore,
all the participants are accountable for their actions.
In the healthcare supply chain, the manufacturer will
be accountable for any drug Lot he produces using the
lotDetails function and pharmacies will be accountable
for any prescription they give to a function because
buyBox function will show where each patient is getting
the drugs from
• Authorization: The critical functions in the smart con-
tract can only be executed by authorised participants
by using the modifier. This ensures protection against
unprivileged access and prevention of any unwanted
entities from using the implemented functions. This is
very important for the healthcare supply chain because
the manufacturing of the drug Lot should only be done
by a verified manufacturer and the prescription of drugs
should be only done by a verified pharmacy.
• Availability: Blockchains are decentralized and dis-
tributed by nature. Therefore, once the smart contract
is deployed on the blockchain, all logs and transactions
are accessible to all participants. Contrary to central-
ized approaches, the transaction data is stored at all
participating nodes therefore loss of a node does not
result in the loss of transaction data. The blockchain
network needs to be up and running all the time for the
application of healthcare supply chain to be successful.
Any downtime might result in delays that are very costly
in the healthcare industry.
• Non-Repudiation: As transactions are cryptographi-
cally signed by the private key of their initiators, cryp-
tographic properties of PKI guarantee that private keys
cannot be deduced from public keys. Therefore, a trans-
action signed by a specific private key can be attributed
to the owner of the key. This is similar to account-
ability where the participants of the blockchain-based
healthcare supply chain cannot deny their actions since
they are already signed by their private key which is
associated with their real identity.
• MITM Attacks: Every transaction in the blockchain
needs to be signed by its initiator’s private key, and
therefore if an intruder tries to modify any of the original
data and information in the blockchain it will not be
confirmed unless it gets signed by the initiator’s private
key. Therefore, MITM attacks are not possible in the
blockchain environment. This feature is indispensable
for the application of healthcare supply chain because
it ensures that only the verified entities can perform
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FIGURE 12. Smart contract vulnerability analysis.
actions within the supply chain, and intruders who ille-
gally try to produce counterfeit drugs in the name of a
verified manufacturer will no longer be able to that.
D. SMART CONTRACT SECURITY ANALYSIS
The developed Ethereum smart contract for drug traceability
was analyzed using specialized tools to reveal any code vul-
nerabilities in addition to the aforementioned security analy-
sis. Those tools were used in code development iterations to
improve the reliability of the smart contract. Remix IDE that
was used to develop the smart contract provides some code
debugging and run-time error warnings. However, they are
not sufficient to establish trust in the smart contract robust-
ness. Therefore, SmartCheck was used to detect vulnerabil-
ities in the code at different severity levels. After multiple
iterations of smart code modification, the smart code was
bug-free as reported by the output. SmartCheck analyzed the
smart contract comparing it to its knowledge base and verified
that it was free from risks that would make it susceptible to
exploitation and cyber-attacks. Oyente tool was also used to
explore the smart contract security. Oyente runs on Linux
and analyzes the code intensively to rule out any hidden
vulnerabilities. It is designed to protect the Ethereum smart
contract from known attacks such as callstack depth attack
and re-entrancy attacks. After analyzing the smart contract,
Oyente generates a result report such as the one shown in Fig-
ure 12. This figure shows the code coverage in addition to
the availability of some crucial vulnerabilities that can be
manipulated for malicious attacks.
E. BLOCKCHAIN LIMITATIONS IN HEALTHCARE
SUPPLY CHAINS
Although the proposed system leverages prominent bene-
fits of blockchain technology, there are number of poten-
tial limitations which should be highlighted to aid deeper
understanding of their potential impact on the proposed sys-
tem. We present a discussion of such potential limitations of
blockchain in healthcare supply chains below.
• Immutability: Blockchains are immutable where any
information appended to the ledger cannot be altered
or removed. While this can be beneficial for data
integrity, it presents a major challenge, there is no way
to correct inaccuracies on a blockchain because they
are immutable. For example, the operators conducting
the physical tasks in the drug supply chain can still
make errors when recording information to the ledger.
Consequently, these errors cannot be corrected even if
it’s detected. In a healthcare supply chain, this can have
unwanted consequences. For example, if the manufac-
turer inserts wrong details of a drug Lot, it can cause
issues later on when it reaches the pharmacy where
a pharmacist might incorrectly prescribe a drug to a
patient.
• Data Privacy: Although immutability is considered one
of the main advantages of blockchains, it can be in
conflict with emerging laws that address information
storage issues. For example, the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in Europe requires that organiza-
tions accurately control where and how data is stored
because the person it is collected from have the right to
modify or delete it any time, and if actions are not taken
according to their requests, the organization can be liable
to heavy fines [50]. In healthcare supply chains, patients
might refuse to have their data stored permanently on
the blockchain and they can legally sue the healthcare
center.
• Scalability: Blockchain requires individual nodes to
process every transaction on the entire network which
provides security and verifiability to the system, but
it limits scalability. However, there is active research
to address this challenge. For instance, Sharding and
Plasma are two scaling solutions for Ethereum that
would eliminate the need for every Ethereum node to
process every transaction on the network [51]. In health-
care supply chains, this might not be an issue if the
manufacturing is done for small to moderate quantities.
However, if a drug is being manufactured in large scale,
the process will be difficult and very slow
• Interoperability: Blockchain networks other than
Ethereum work in their own unique way which leads to
interoperability issues where the different blockchains
are not able to communicate with each other. If a uni-
fied blockchain-based solution is used among healthcare
centers, this problem can be avoided. However, if health-
care centers decide to use different blockchain-based
solutions with different platforms, it will be very diffi-
cult to make them interoperable.
• Efficiency: The efficiency of the blockchain solution
is highly dependent on the coding of the smart con-
tract and also the consensus algorithm used to verify
and confirm a transaction. The former determines how
costly the implementation and execution process will be,
and the latter determines the energy consumption level.
The healthcare supply chain involves many transactions,
therefore it’s very important for the smart contract to be
coded properly so that it executes quickly and efficiently.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have investigated the challenge of drug
traceability within pharmaceutical supply chains highlight-
ing its significance especially to protect against counterfeit
drugs. We have developed and evaluated a blockchain-based
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solution for the pharmaceutical supply chain to track and
trace drugs in a decentralized manner. Specifically, our pro-
posed solution leverages cryptographic fundamentals under-
lying blockchain technology to achieve tamper-proof logs of
events within the supply chain and utilizes smart contracts
within Ethereum blockchain to achieve automated recording
of events that are accessible to all participating stakeholders.
We have demonstrated that our proposed solution is cost
efficient in terms of the amount of gas spent in execut-
ing the different functions that are triggered within the
smart contract. Moreover, the conducted security analysis
has shown that our proposed solution achieves protection
against malicious attempts targeting is integrity, availability
and non-repudiation of transaction data which is critical in
a complex multi-party settings such as the pharmaceutical
supply chain.
We continue our efforts to enhance the efficiency of phar-
maceutical supply chains and envision to focus on extending
the proposed system to achieve end to end transparency and
verifiability of drugs use as future work.
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